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A Relational Turn for Data Protection?
Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog*

If there’s one thing everyone in the data protection debate can agree on, it’s that it’s all
about the data. All over the world, data protection regimes fixate on when data can
be collected, how it is being processed, when it can be accessed or should be deleted, and whether it is personal, sensitive, or deidentified. This is true even for approaches that seem quite different at first glance, such as the U.S. and EU.1
But what if our shared focus on the data is too narrow? Data protection as a concept
is a relatively new response to a specific technology: the database. In the decades following the Second World War, societies began to realize that data could be aggregated, made searchable, and stored in a pristine state for a remarkably low cost. Lawmakers needed a plan to make sure data could be collected and stored in these databases
in a safe and sustainable way. The Fair Information Practices Principle (FIPs), developed with contributions from Americans and Europeans, laid the blueprint for privacy on both sides of the Atlantic.2 These principles focus on procedural rights like transparency, consent, safeguards, purpose limitations, and data minimization, in service
of informational self-determination and a sustainable environment for data processing. Because they emphasize choice and individual autonomy, FIP-based regimes tend
to lack substantive prohibitions on particular kinds of data practices. The concept of
data protection has been wildly successful in terms of adoption by government and
industry. But has it been effective? The jury is still out.
The strongest implementation of the FIPs to date is the GDPR, which has been lauded
for its robust and holistic approach. But the GDPR has also failed to reckon with the
sheer power of the modern data industrial complex. These companies risk more than
just our dignitary interests in our personal data – they control what we see, what we
click, and in many cases what we believe. Data is dangerous in the hands of these
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companies not just because it is personal to us, but because in their hands it becomes
power that can be wielded to control people and institutions.3 It exposes us in ways
that risk more than just identification or denial of control. Data protection regimes
were not designed to confront this kind of adversary.4 Originating in the 1970s, when
home computing and mobile phones were still science fiction in the mode of Star Trek,
the FIPs were a managerial approach for an analog age. Their approach never questioned that data processing might not always be a worthy endeavor, or that what seemed
like large amounts of data in the 1970s might seem quaint a half-century later. Most
importantly, the FIPs approach never considered that future consumers and citizens
might create so much data and have so many commercial and government accounts
that informational self-determination could become impossible. Today, unfortunately,
we are living in that never-considered future.
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There is, however, a different way to approach data privacy. It has less to do with the
data itself and more to do with people and their relationships. Specifically, it looks at
how the people who expose themselves and the people that are inviting that disclosure relate to each other. It is concerned with what powerful parties owe to vulnerable parties not just with their personal information, but with the things they see, the
things they can click, the decisions that are made about them. It’s less about the nature of data and more about the nature of power. And it can make data protection work
better. We call this the relational turn in privacy law. The folly of our modern privacy
predicament is our failure to anticipate the sheer power that results from the scale and
size of these large tech companies. We had our eyes trained so much on the data that
we lost sight of the power that comes from inequality and inequity in relationships,
even when data is fairly processed. But it wasn’t always this way.
Long before databases or even film cameras, privacy law was primarily about relationships. American understandings of privacy are traditionally dated to Warren and Brandeis’ influential 1890 law review article ‘The Right to Privacy,’ which called for a cause
of action against the press for spreading true but private facts.5 The authors rested their
argument on a large and sometimes ancient body of law protecting information in the
context of relationships, including evidentiary privileges, confidential relations, blackmail law, and government records.6 But unlike studio photographers, married couples,
pen-pals, and trustees, the new, aggressive press of the Gilded Age didn’t have a relationship with the subjects of its reportage. Warren and Brandeis thus conceived of ‘the
right to privacy’ as tort-based rather than relationship-based, applying weakly to all
the world rather than strongly in the context of existing relationships.7 It focused on
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the nature of the data and whether it was public or private, which became a focus on
whether data uses were ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ in American tort law,
and whether the data being processed was ‘sensitive’ or not in data protection regimes.8
Although the database shifted the focus of privacy law away from relationships of trust
for quite some time, America seems to be rekindling its appreciation for them, perhaps
recognizing the limits of focusing too closely on the nature of the data and too little
on the relationships in which that data is used. A scholarly movement taking relationships seriously in privacy law that began over decade ago is increasingly active and
visible.9 Some scholars (including the authors of this paper), have advocated for legal
rules that draw upon the law of fiduciaries to impose duties of loyalty, confidentiality,
and care on tech companies as a way of curbing harmful self-dealing and reckless behavior from tech companies in their data processing and the design of their products.10
Lawmakers in the U.S. have also proposed legislation that cements these duties within information relationships of trust.11
The clear advantage of a relational approach is that it is acutely sensitive to the power disparities within information relationships. Tech companies control what we see,
what we can click on, and what sorts of information they want to extract from their
customers. They have incredible resources that help them predict and nudge our behavior and have the financial incentive to keep us ever more exposed. Duties of loy-
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alty protect against self-dealing and duties of care protect against dangerous behavior.
The greater the power imbalance and the more people are made vulnerable through
exposure, the stricter the duty to which the trusted party is held.12
Data protection regimes, by contrast target, imbalances of power within relationships
more indirectly by looking to the nature of the data. Rules under the data protection
model are largely procedural ones, with a few important exceptions. These provisions
are combined with data subject rights against all who process their data, and structural proportions, under the idea fair processing is, in and of itself, a way to mitigate power. But these frameworks are not primarily intended to restrict processing, rather to ensure that processing happens in a legitimate manner.13 Thus, while relational duties
explicitly prioritize the best interests of vulnerable parties, data protection regimes ostensibly pre-code the best interests of data subjects into rules and rights built around
the fair information practices. But data privacy should be about more than just the FIPs
and informational self-determination.14 Properly understood, data privacy is about civil rights, free expression, freedom from harassment, collective autonomy interests, and
how personal information is leveraged to erode our attention spans, our mental wellbeing, and our public institutions. The GDPR, CCPA, and other data protection regimes
around the world fail to undertake a holistic inquiry that is sufficiently sensitive to such
values except in the case of ‘legitimate interest’ processing.
Data protection frameworks are not agnostic to the status and power of actors, of
course. Much hinges on whether people are processors, controllers, or data subjects.
But these frameworks typically do not account for the power imbalances between these
parties. They essentially treat all relationships between data subjects and controllers
the same. Put another way, data protection law flattens the power dynamics of specific relationships, treating your relationship with Google the same the one you have with
your grocer. And while Google and your grocer might collect some similar kinds of
information in the abstract – your shopping habits and credit card information, for example – you are significantly more vulnerable to Google or any tech platform than you
are to your grocer. By controlling your mediated environments in ways that expose
you, these companies are able to leverage information they have about you, your network, and people it thinks are similar to you to choose what ads you see, whose posts
you see, how you are able to interact with them, and what other people see about you.
The relational turn in data privacy rachets up the obligations based in a way that is proportional to this exposure.
We think a relational turn for data protection would be superior to the current model,
even of the GDPR, which is still FIPs-based in its bones. A relational turn would provide a path towards more substantive rules that would limit how peoples’ data could

12 Balkin, (n 10) 13-14.
13 Eg, Bart van der Sloot, ‘The General Data Protection Regulation in Plain Language’ (2020) 28-29.
14 Woodrow Hartzog, ‘The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices’ 76 Md L Rev 952 (2017); Hartzog and Richards (n 1).
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be used against them. It would focus on the real problem that privacy and data protection law should tackle – the power consequences of information relationships, making legitimacy of processing a question of fundamental fairness rather than data hygiene. Substantive data rules would demand more than that data serve a ‘legitimate
interest’ of the data processor.15 They would focus on the power consequences of processing on the data subject, whether we apply some version of the classic fiduciary
duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty, or the trust-promoting duties of honesty,
protection, discretion, and loyalty that we have called for in other work.16
Perhaps equally important, duties of loyalty and care would allow data protection
regimes to finally jettison the concept of consent, which it has long been skeptical of.
Instead of obsessing over whether the consent people gave was a truly meaningful, informed, and revocable choice, relational duties allow for a decoupling of choice and
consent. People would be protected no matter what they choose.17
Notably, the European Commission might have just taken the first major step towards
a relational turn in E.U. data protection law. On Nov. 25, 2020, the Commission issued a proposal for a regulation on European data governance (Data Governance Act).18
This proposal includes a remarkable number of bold data privacy interventions designed to increase trust in data intermediaries, including the idea that ‘Data sharing
providers that intermediate the exchange of data between individuals as data holders
and legal persons should, in addition, bear fiduciary duty towards the individuals, to
ensure that they act in the best interest of the data holders.’19 We have long argued for
a similarly articulated duty for those entrusted with our information and our online experiences. We think this duty should be the foundation of modern data privacy frameworks and should be applied in a much broader way to encompass all information relationships with significant power disparities.
Much work remains to be done in fleshing out some of the practical the details of the
relational turn.20 Neither Rome nor the FIPs were built in a day, and for all of its flaws,
the FIPs model does have the advantage of a half-century’s head start. But we worry
that if we continue to head down the path of focusing solely on data in service of informational self-determination, it will actually have the effect of continuing to disempower human beings rather than helping them. Ultimately we face a question of what
we want the law to do here, and we believe strongly that the informational self-deter-

15 Cf GDPR Art 6.
16 Eg, Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law’ (2016) 19 Stan Tech L Rev 431; Neil Richards and Woodrow
Hartzog, ‘A Duty of Loyalty in Privacy Law’ (2020) (unpublished manuscript) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3642217>.
17 For an extended critique of consent-based models for data processing, see Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘The Pathologies of
Digital Consent’ (forthcoming 2019) Wash U L Rev <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3370433>.
18 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on European data governance (Data Governance Act), <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single
-market/en/news/proposal-regulation-european-data-governance-data-governance-act> (2020).
19 ibid
20 Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘A Duty of Loyalty in Privacy Law’ (2020) (unpublished manuscript) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3642217>; Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘The Pathologies of Digital Consent’ (forthcoming 2019) Wash U L Rev
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3370433>.
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mination model has been a failure in practice and promises more failure as it confronts
the new problems on the horizon: ever-increasing volumes of processing, algorithmic
decisionmaking, artificial intelligence, and augmented reality. It’s time to try something different. Lawmakers and judges should focus on power and vulnerability and
place substantive limitations on the ability of the powerful to manipulate us against
our interests. After all, the goal of data protection law should be to promote trust in
the digital environment, rather than stoke fear, anxiety, and a sense of being overwhelmed by its complexity. Building trust requires us to focus directly on power imbalances in relationships rather than indirectly through data rules. It’s time for data
protection’s relational turn.
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